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LEARNED TREATISES AS EVIDENCE
IN WISCONSIN
MARVIN C. HOLZ*
Since Lewandowski v. Preferred Rish Mutual Insurance Co.,'
learned treatises may be used as substantive evidence in direct examina-
tion as well as impeaching evidence on cross-examination. Their use as
direct or corroborative probative evidence is the innovation; their use
as contradictory evidence in cross-examination is the generally accepted
rule.
Lewandowski changed the previous rule to permit the use of learned
treatises prospectively as independent substantive evidence upon the
laying of a proper foundation of reliability. Prior thereto only under
circumstances in which a witness in some manner indicated that he had
relied upon the written authorities could such authorities be used on
cross-examination to impeach or discredit the witness if those authorities
were in fact to the contrary of the witness's testimony.
In a very broad sense Lewandowski is a return to the original rule
in Wisconsin. It was first held that the reading from medical or scientific
works to the jury was within the discretion of the court.2 Some 33 years
later the Wisconsin court adopted the majority rule of excluding such
evidence when offered as direct evidence. 3 The cycle has now been com-
pleted; however, the present version is more sophisticated than its
predecessor.
Although most of the students of the law of evidence have criticized
the rule against the admissibility of learned treatises as direct probative
evidence,4 only two other states give general application to the rule of
admissibility. New Jersey is sometimes reported as having included rule
of admissibility when it adopted new rules of evidence in 1967. Although
such a rule was recommended by its Committee, the rule was deleted
from the final code. The Supreme Court of Louisiana has stated in
State v. Nicolosi,5 that it could see no reason why an expert could not
read from a treatise to corroborate his testimony, but the effect of the
decision as authority to admit such evidence as direct evidence is weak-
ened by its holding that what was read was not prejudicial. Alabama has
held authoritative medical books to be admissible as direct evidence
*Circuit Judge, Milwaukee County, 1966-; County Judge, Civil Division,
1962-1966; Law Fellow and Research Director, Wisconsin Law Review, 1943;
J.D. University of Wisconsin Law School, 1942.
133 Wis. 2d 69, 146 N.W.2d 505 (1966).
2 Luning v. State, 2 Pin. (Wis.) 215 (1849) ; Luning v. State, 2 Pin. (Wis.) 285
(1849).
3 Stelling v. Thorp, 54 Wis. 528, 11 N.W. 906 (1882).
4 6 WIGMORE, EVIOENCE, § 1691 (3d ed. 1940) ; Note, 46 IowA L. REv. 463 (1961).
5 228 La. 65, 81 So.2d 771 (1955).
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since 1857.6 More recently the State of Kansas has done the same by
the adoption of the Uniform Rules of Evidence .7 Massachusetts and
Nevada have made limited concessions by permitting the use of treatises
directly in medical malpractice cases." South Carolina authorizes their
admissibility on issues involving sanity or poisoning. 9 Statutes author-
izing the admission of books of science or art as evidence of facts of
general interest and notoriety have not been construed to embrace medi-
cal treatises. 10
The purpose of this article is to assist trial courts and trial attorneys
in the administration of the rules governing the use of learned treatises
in trial. Lewandowski itself contains little guide to the handling of these
problems. The case law of those jurisdictions which permit the use of
learned treatises as substantive evidence is limited. Nevertheless re-
ference to the existing case law and academic writings suggest many
of the problems which will be encountered and provide some guidance.
An understanding of the underlying objections to the use of such treatises
as direct evidence will enable the court to administer the rules to avoid
the consequences of valid objectionable features to such evidence and
yet allow the court or jury to have the benefit of relevant evidence.
Actual trial experience since Lewandowski demonstrates that it is the
unusual medical or scientific case in which counsel will resort to learned
treatises.
USE AS DIRECT SUBSTANTIVE EVIDENCE
Briefly stated the present rule is that when the foundation is laid
that a work is authoritative, such works are admissible as independent
evidence to prove the truth of the statement contained therein. The
foundation may be laid by an expert in the field or by judicial notice.
Proof that the work is recognized by the medical profession as authorita-
tive or that it has an influence upon medical opinions is proof of its
reliability.
Presumably the Wisconsin Supreme Court adopted Rule 63 (31) of
the Uniform Rules of Evidence.
Rule 63 (31) of the Uniform Rules of Evidence reads as follows:
A published treatise, periodical, or pamphlet on a subject of
history, science or art should be admissible in evidence as an
exception to the hearsay rule to prove the truth of a matter stated
therein if the judge takes judicial notice or a witness expert in
6 Stoudenmeier v. Williamson, 29 Ala. 558 (1857).
7KANS. CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE § 60-401 (cc) (1964).
8 NEV. REV. STAT. § 51.040 (1957); MAss. ANN. LAWS, Ch. 233 § 79(c) (1956);
see also, Kehoe, Massachusetts Malpractice Evidentiary Statute-Success or
Failure?, 44 B.U.L. REV. 10 (1964); Note, 45 MINN. L. REV. 1019 (1961).
9 S.C. CODE § 26-142 (1952).
10 Gallagher v. Market St. R.R. Co., 67 Col. 13, 6 P. 869 (1885) ; Bixby v. Omaha
& C. B. Rwy. & Bridge Co., 105 Iowa 293, 75 N.W. 182 (1898) ; Van Skike v.
Potter, 53 Neb. 28, 73 N.W. 295 (1887).
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the subject testifies that the treatise, periodical, or pamphlet is
a reliable authority in the subject.
The Court's reference to Jones on Evidence and the Model Code of
Evidence indicates that the rule will be applied within the framework of
those authorities."
Pros and Cons
The usual principal objection to the admissibility of learned treatises
as substantive evidence is that the facts or opinions contained therein
are hearsay. As hearsay it constitutes testimony not given under oath
and there is no opportunity to evaluate the credibility of the author by
observance of his demeanor as if he were present in court. A more ser-
ious objection is the lack of cross-examination to determine how a stated
opinion was reached, whether the author still believes in the concept or
conclusion stated, or that his conclusions stated in the treatise would
necessarily follow in the same factual situation as presented in the case
being tried.
A second argument against admissibility is that scientific concepts
and "facts" constantly change. Research and discovery continually alter
accepted theory and opinion. What may have been standard last year is
discarded this year.
Thirdly it is argued that extracts from such books can be used un-
fairly by the selection of passages out of context or without presentation
of qualifying material contained therein which bear upon the issue.
A further argument against admissibility is that the reading of tech-
nical material without oral comment or expert explanation of a live
witness may be confusing and misleading to the jurors.
A related and fifth argument is that the use of such extracts without
explanation by an expert live witness offers counsel an opportunity to
deliberately or innocently advance and argue unwarranted conclusions,
interpretations or inferences from such data or opinion.
Quite out of harmony with current methods of medical practice and
education today is the notion and argument found in older decisions
that true medical knowledge is derived primarily from the personal ex-
perience of physician. A number of early Wisconsin cases held that an
expert witness could not testify upon a subject if he had not had per-
sonal experience in reference to the matter at issue and his knowledge
was derived only from medical or scientific books and instruction.
12
112 JONEs, EvIDNCE § 421 (5th ed. 1966 Supp.) provides that upon direct exam-
ination of an expert witness on medical science, extracts from treatises in that
science which he states are recognized in his profession as authoratative and
which have influenced or fended to confirm his opinion may be used. Rule 529
A, MODEL CODE OF EviDENCE, is substantially the same as the Uniform Rules.
12 Boyle v. State, 57 Wis. 472, 15 N.W. 827 (1883); Saquet v. State, 72 Wis.
659, 40 N.W. 391 (1888) ; Zoldoske v. State, 82 Wis. 580, 52 N.W. 778 (1892).
Perhaps the premise of this concept rested upon the early method of medical
education. In the 17th and 18th centuries medical education was by way of
an apprenticeshsip system. The likely youth was indentured at an early age
1967-68]
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A seventh contention against admissibility is that the printed word
permits an undue psychological impact upon the jury. It is argued that
the mere fact that the evidence appears in printed form lends a credence
which is not accorded to the spoken word.
Finally it is claimed that the permitted use of learned treatises would
turn a trial into a "battle of the books."
As previously suggested the opinion in Lewandowski did not present
the counter-arguments in support of the rule or the decision. Justice
Hallows merely observed that the adoption of the rule was "but another
example of accepting the scientific process in the search for truth instead
of reliance upon the efficacy of an oath as a guarantee of trustworthi-
ness." This terse statement of course is a clear recognition that modern
medical practitioner today derives a much larger portion of his knowl-
edge than formerly upon the authoritative literature in the field. A doctor
who seeks to provide the best medicine available today must in a great
measure rely upon the professionally accepted literature as part of his
continuing medical education. This is particularly true of the specialist
who appears as an expert witness in complex medical litigation. Every
medical witness when formulating his opinion relies upon a considerable
body of literature in addition to his own experience. A New Jersey court
has described this by saying "to the extent that he so relies on the litera-
ture in the field, his stated opinion is infected with hearsay."' 3 The court
then observed that although his opinion was readily received, the litera-
ture upon which it rested was not.
Counter-arguments in behalf of admissibility are that (1) treatises
recognized by the profession as authoritative are trustworthy, (2) the
expense of producing a person truly qualified by personal experience in
the areas of difficult medical litigation make it necessary to resort to
writings as a resource, (3) such evidence may be sufficiently important
to outweigh the dangers of its likelihood to mislead, confuse or prejudice
the jury, and (4) those objections can be overcome by the proper ad-
ministration of the rule permitting admissibility.
Proponents of the rule of admissibility argue that reliable treatises
should be admitted as an exception to the hearsay rule because the
writer had no motive to misrepresent. His work is not prepared for
purposes of litigation. It is written with the foreknowledge that it will
be subjected to high professional critical analysis and scrutiny. Accuracy
is insured because the writing is intended to pass on knowledge to stu-
to a reputable practitioner to whom his service was "successively menial,
pharmaceutical and professional." His training of course varied with the
capacity and the conscientiousness of the master. However, in the early part
of the 18th century there was a beginning of utilization of hospitals and lecture
halls and eventual transition to current methods and standards. See Medical
Education in the United States and Canada, a Report to the Carneige Founda-
tion for the Advancement of Teaching by Abraham Flexner, Bulletin No. 4,
576 5th Avenue, New York City.13 Ruth v. Fenchel, 37 N.J. Super. 295, 117 A.2d 284, 294 (1955).
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dents and practitioners. Professor Wigmore adds the consideration of
necessity. He states that the ordinary expert witness frequently has
gained a larger proportion of the knowledge of the subject upon which
he will be questioned from study rather than personal observation. Thus
the witness reproduces conclusions of others whose authority he accepts.
The expense of producing such authorities at trial most frequently is
disproportionately costly and inconvenient.'4
In fact there is an anomaly in that although the expert's testimony
itself is admissible the foundation of his testimony is not.'15 Is it not
better to permit the resource itself rather than the recollections of the
witnesses of the source of his information? Science does not shift as
quickly as the opponents of the rule for admissibility contend. Proper
foundation that the book is authoritative and accepted as such by the
profession is a condition for admissibility. Before new ideas in medicine
are accepted professionally they are first presented to the profession and
carefully considered.
The remaining objections concerning unfair use, dangers of confu-
sion, undue psychological advantage and "battle of books" can be al-
leviated by the imposition of court rules of procedure and wise
administration by the trial court. These procedural rules and methods
of administering the rule will be discussed later.
The rule permitting admissibility also has a prophylactic effect in
that it serves as a restraint upon the otherwise unrestrained professional
witness who knows that he can be confronted with the written authori-
ties to the contrary on cross-examination or rebuttal if he wanders too
far afield from legitimate opinion.
Finally a rule of admissibility will eliminate attempts to get the
contents of a written treatise into evidence by indirection through cross-
examination. An examination of the law of the use of treatises on
cross-examination in the various jurisdictions reveals that there is a
lack of clarity and a good deal of sophistry in the decisions which invites
attempts to get such material before the jury in one way or another.'6
A rule permitting admissibility will help clarify the proper use of
treatises on cross-examination and will lead to the incorporation of cer-
tain safeguards concerning the use of treatises in cross-examination
which are insisted upon when such treatises are used in direct examina-
tion.
Foundation for Admissibility
The work must be shown to be authoritative, recognized by the
medical profession or one which has influence upon medical opinion in
order to be admissible as substantive evidence of the truth stated therein.
' Note 4, supra.
"s VAND L. REV. 473, 482-486 (1962).
16 See Note, 29 U. CINc. L. REv. 255 (1960) ; CRoss EXAMINING BY BOOKS, 41 J.
CnRi. L., C. & P.S. 192 (1950-51).
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It would appear that proof of the author's recognized leadership in
his field and the current use of the writing as an authoritative source
in the field are essential. In addition the judge has to make a determina-
tion that the offered extract is relevant. This will require a determination
that the opinions in the offered extrac relate to the same factual situation
as the case being tried and do not involve a wholly unwarranted interpre-
tation of technical data or opinion by counsel. Finally the Court must
determine that the offered portion will be meaningful to the jury and
therefore probative.
Proof of Reliability
Reliability is usually established by a doctor called by the proponent
who will give testimony establishing the profession's reliance upon the
treatise and that the book is a standard authority. Many times this will
be by way of corroborating the witness's own testimony. Reliability can
be established through the opponent's expert, but such is not always
certain. Of course if he denies being conversant with a standard author-
ity or having knowledge of its reliability he runs the risk of being shown
to be medically illiterate upon rebuttal.
The Uniform Rules of Evidence permit reliability to be established
by judicial notice when the work is so notorious that production of
testimony establishing the required qualifications and acceptance is un-
necessary. Generally the term "notorious" in this context, is defined as
that which is commonly known and accepted as true and which is not
the subject of intelligent dispute. The instances in which reliability can
be established but judicial notice will be rare and confined to those
situations where reliability is clearly indisputable.
Care should be exercised to distinguish between the reputation or
reliability of a particular writing of the author and the author's general
professional reputation itself. Periodicals and pamphlets are embraced
within the rule as well as treatises. Most current writings appear in the
former. Some of these may not yet have been accepted as authoritative
by the profession or they may be outside of the expertise for which the
author is recognized. Nevertheless, the opinion of an outstanding expert
in the field may be given great weight though not generally accepted
because of its newness. This would be particularly true when there is
no established opinion to the contrary.
It would seem that a librarian of a medical school could establish
reliability by testifying that a treatise is currently used as resource mate-
rial in the courses taught. On the other hand medical-legal publications
written for a particular segment of the Bar might be inadmissible be-
cause of the want of trustworthiness. It has been prophesized that
adoption of a rule permitting admissibility of learned treatises as direct
evidence will produce a harvest of literature written with an eye to liti-
gation.
[ Vol. 51
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Medical treatises are not in themselves self-proving, that is to say,
it must be shown that the work in question is recognized as a standard
authority by the medical profession by way of competent testimony or
judicial notice. Extracts from Gray's Attorney's Textbook on Medicine
were not permitted to be entered into evidence because of the want of
such proof. 7 Biographical data such as is contained in the front of the
book itself or in the publisher's notes on the paper jacket is not sufficient
to establish the author's professional standing.:' For similar reasons
medical directories including Who's Who are not sufficient to establish
the author's qualifications. Statements concerning the author whether
appearing in the book itself or in directories constitute hearsay which
is not always trustworthy, are self-serving and are subject to puffing.'9
For the reason that the attorney in the case is not a competent expert
medical witness the assertions of counsel that the author is one of the
recognized authorities is not sufficient.20 The testimony of a single doctor
is sufficient to establish that a particular work is or is not a standard
authority.2' Standards for electroshock treatment prepared by a com-
mittee on therapy and approved by the Council of American Psychiatric
Association acknowledged by the defendant's doctor as authentic and
applicable were held to be sufficient to permit admission. In Stone v.
Proctor,2 2 a malpractice case, the standards were found to be non-
controversial and to reflect the consensus of those who practiced electro-
shock therapy. The defendant doctor acknowledged their authenticity
and applicability.
Testimony that a treatise was a bit old, but was recognized as a good
book has been held sufficient to establish authoritativeness. 23 Similarly,
the testimony of a doctor that he examined a list of treatises, that he
knew many of them, thought that the authors know their business per-
mitted an appellate court to assume that the book received in evidence
by the trial court was based upon a finding that it was authoritative and
relevant has been held to be sufficient. The appellate court would not
say as a matter of law upon appeal that the science of obstetrics had
changed in the intervening ten years since the book was published
so as to preclude a preliminary finding of relevancy. 24
The reliability of course is affected by the currency of the material.
A writing may be outdated or might be too recent to have gained ac-
ceptance in the profession. Many courts have given as the reason for
denying the admission of treatises that the medical science as an induc-
'7 Smarr v. State, 260 Ala. 30, 68 So.2d 6 (1953).18 Reddington v. Clayman, 334 Mass. 244, 134 N.E.2d 920 (1956).
'9 Note 18 supra; Ramsland v. Shaw, 341 Mass. 56, 166 N.E.2d 894 (1960).
20 Laird v. Boston & M. R.R., 80 N.H. 377, 117 A. 591 (1922).
21 Brodhead v. Wiltse, 35 Iowa 442 (1872).
22259 N.C. 633, 131 S.E.2d 297 (1963).
23 Batson v. Batson, 217 Ala. 450, 117 So. 10 (1928).
24 Thomas v. Ellis, 329 Mass. 93, 106 N.E.2d 687 (1952).
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tive science is constantly shifting because of new discoveries and revised
conclusions.25
On the other hand an article may be rejected because it was too
recently written and upon a subject of recent discovery so that the con-
clusions are not given weight as yet by the profession.2 6 Nevertheless,
a court may determine the lack of currency or lack of acceptance because
of recency may affect the weight rather than admissibility.
Relevancy
Ordinarily a court has little difficulty in determining an issue of
relevancy. In complex medical questions the court is of course out of
its field of expertise; hence it may experience difficulty in determining
whether a given passage tends to prove or disprove a medical fact in
issue. Two solutions present themselves to this problem.
First of all the Court may permit the extract to be read only if
explained by a live expert witness. Professor Wigmore suggests that
the proper rule is for the Court to allow the use of the printed treatise
when approved and read aloud by a witness expert in that subject."
The other approach is to adopt a rule that notice prior to trial must
be given to the Court and opposing counsel when it is intended that
treatises will be used. Sufficient particularity should be required and
arrangements made if necessary so that the Court has an opportunity
to read the materials in context prior to trial. There is nothing improper
for a judge to have some fundamental knowledge bearing upon such
issues prior to the trial. Counsel for the parties undertake considerable
study of the science involved in preparation for trial. Unless a judge
has a basic understanding of the facts, opinions, and issues he cannot
rule intelligently on objections as the case is presented and proceeds.
Both approaches have other advantages which will be discussed
later in reference to some of the other problems and objections to a
rule permitting admissibility.
Frequently learned treatises will contain tables which will be offered
to support a contention in issue. Care must be exercised to insure that
the data upon which the tables or charts were compiled is relevant and
reflects conditions similar to those in issue.
Extrinsic Policies Affecting Admissibility
The opprobrious phrase "battle of books" implies that a number of
objectionable effects would result from the adoption of a rule permitting
the admissibility of learned treatises. Insofar as the phrase suggests the
25 Wilcox v. Crumpton, 219 Iowa 389, 258 N.W. 704 (1935) ; Washington National
Bank v. Daily, 166 Ind. 631, 77 N.E. 53 (1906); Bixby v. Omaha & C. & B.
Ry. & Bridge Co., 105 Iowa 293, 75 N.W. 182 (1898); Johnston v. Richmond
& D.R. Co. 95 Ga. 685, 22 S.E. 694 (1895); St. Louis A. & T. Ry. Co. v.
Jones, 14 S.W. 309 Tex. (1890); Banner Tobacco Co. v. Jenison, 48 Mich.
459, 12 N.W. 655 (1882).
26State v. Catellier, 63 Wyo. 123, 179 P.2d 203 (1947).
27 Note 4, supra.
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use of great stacks of books, the Court within its discretion has consid-
erable control in determining the extent to which cumulative evidence
may be received and how it will be received. The Wisconsin law is that
a trial court is not required to hear evidence which is merely repetitive
and cumulative even on a controlling issue and at some point, dependent
upon the circumstances, has discretion to end the procession of wit-
nesses on adequately covered issues .2
Other of the objections to the rule permitting admission of learned
treatises may be mitigated or avoided by rules of the Court. In some
cases the evidence itself may have to be excluded in the discretion of the
Court because of these objections. Certain principles supporting these
rules of court or the exclusion of such evidence are set forth in Rule
4 of the New Jersey Rules of Evidence.2 9 Although these principles
apply generally to the New Jersey rules of evidence, they have particular
application to the use of learned treatises as evidence. Rule 4 is entitled
"Discretion of Judge to Exclude Admissible Evidence" and is as follows:
The judge may in his descretion exclude evidence if he finds
that it probative value is substantially outweighed by the risk
that its admission will either (a) necessitate undue consumption
of time or (b) create substantial danger of undue prejudice or
of confusing the issues or of misleading the jury.
Another provision appearing in the original draft and which would
have permitted the judge to exclude such evidence if it would unfairly
and harmfully surprise a party who had not had reasonable opportunity
to anticipate such evidence was deleted from the rule as adopted. Gen-
erally evidence cannot be excluded or trials held up merely on the
basis of surprise, however courts do have the power to grant necessary
continuances in the interest of justice.
No doubt the use of learned treatises in a frontier medical-legal
issue can bog down a trial over and above the problem of cumulative
evidence. Whether the time consumed by the introduction and use of
such evidence becomes an undue consumption of time must be deter-
mined in the discretion of the court in the light of its relative importance.
A "battle of experts" who are often times less objective than the written
authorities produces the same trial problems.
The problem of undue consumption of time can be lessened by a
court rule requiring timely notice prior to trial that counsel intends to
use particular treatises. This notice should be given sufficiently prior
to the trial or pretrial so that there can be a meaningful discussion of
the use of such authorities at the pretrial. Such notice is required under
281i re Kaiman's Estate, 13 Wis. 2d 201. 108 N.W.2d 379 (1961); Brandt v.
Matson, 256 Wis. 314, 41 N.W.2d 272 (1949); Griswold v. Nichols, 126 Wis.
401, 105 N.W. 815 (1906) ; see also, Ruth v. Fenchel, 37 N.J. Super. 295, 117
A.2d 284 (1955).
29 N.J.S. Ann. 2A: 86A, Rule 4.
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the Massachusetts and Nevada malpractice statutes. A New Jersey court
has suggested that notice be given of intention to use a treatise in cross-
examination.
30
First of all the collateral issue of reliability and authoritativeness
,iiay be disposed of at the pretrial. Ideally the books should be presented
at pretrial and the exact passages to be introduced should be marked.
As already observed this practice gives the Court an opportunity to read
the materials prior to trial and to enable it to rule intelligently on rele-
vancy and determine what other qualifying passages should be read.
Very frequently counsel will stipulate that certain passages may be read
if others are also read. The presentation of both passages at one time
to the jury sometimes is more meaningful than if the qualifying passage
is withheld until cross-examination. Such is particularly true if the
direct examination is lengthy and protracted. Many times there will be
agreement that both extracts should be read at one time. This in part
depends upon the trial strategy of counsel; however the final determina-
tion of how it should be prevented lies within the discretion of the Court.
If the passages are marked or reproduced so that each counsel and
the Court has a copy, such constitutes a great convenience at the trial.
Many people absorb information through the written word more readily
than if presented orally. If a copy is in the hands of the Court and coun-
sel much time is saved by eliminating the necessity of having the re-
porter searching his notes to determine what the precise language was
or how much was read.
The danger of misuse by reading out of context as has been already
indicated can be remedied by the requirement of prior notice. Of course
questions of what should be read to the jury can be handled in chambers
during trial, but such needlessly consumes trial time. In addition, experts
called by opposing counsel will quickly direct the attention of the jury
to the qualifying passages of the treatise. Prior notice will permit the
adversary process to ensure that the writer's views are fully put before
the jury. The Court too has a role to see that the treatises are used
fairly 31
When it is necessary that it is essential for the comprehension of the
jury that there by oral explanation of the information because of techni-
cal terminology or complexity of fact contained in the learned treatise
sought to be introduced, the Court can require that it be offered only in
that -manner.3
2
The danger that the jury will place undue emphasis upon the printed
word can be countered in a number of ways. First of all if prior notice
30 Note 13, supra.
31 Conn. Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Ellis, 89 Il1. 516 (1878).
32See Watkins v Potts, 219 Ala. 427, 122 So. 416 (1929); Bixby v. Omaha &
C. & B. Ry. & Bridge Co., 105 Iowa 293, 75 N.W. 182 (1898) ; People v. Hall,
48 Mich. 482, 12 N.W. 665 (1882); Staudenmeier v. Williamson, 29 Ala. 558(1857); VI WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 1691 (3rd. ed. 1940).
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is given, opposing counsel has adequate opportunity to research the
literature and present opposing written thought. The weight of the im-
personal black type can be effectively minimized by the oral testimony
of a knowledgeable live witness. Finally the extract should not go to
the jury when it deliberates unless all of the evidence on the issue in-
cluding the transcribed testimony be given to the jury. Obviously be-
cause of expediency considerations this is usually impossible. If a jury
asks a specific question concerning the content of the extract it might
be sufficient to call the jury back and read it to them. If the inquiry is
more general, all evidence on the point might have to be read back to
the jury.
Reliable writings like reliable oral testimony are entitled to be given
the weight they deserve.
USE AS CONTRADICTORY EVIDENCE IN CROSS-EXAMINATION
Courts universally permit the use of learned treatises in cross-
examination to attack an expert's credibility to show that the authorities
upon which he relies do not support his views. This assumes of course
that he has in some manner indicated in his direct testimony that particu-
lar authorities or the authorities generally sustain his position.
Some courts permit the introduction of such treatises on cross-
examination simply on the basis that the witness acknowledges that the
book offered by the cross examiner is a standard authority. Others allow
such books to be used to attack the witness's qualifications by showing
that standard authorities disagree with him.33 To do either and yet
deny the introduction of learned treatise as direct substantive evidence
is inconsistent.
Wisconsin Law Prior to Lewandowski
Wisconsin law concerning the use of learned treatises prior to
Lewandowski can be capsulized as follows: Medical treatises could be
used to impeach or discredit a witness if he testified (1) that a particu-
lar authority supported his statement when in fact it did not (2) that the
recognized authorities supported his view when in fact there were opin-
ions to the contrary, (3) that he knew of no authority which supported
a contrary theory to the" one espoused by him, or (4) to show that he
formerly expressed an opinion in a particular treatise with which he
later differed. It was also held that when an expert testified entirely
from his own knowledge and experience he could not be impeached by
reading into the record from contradictory written authorities. Finally,
extracts from treatises could not be used under the guise of cross-
examination to place before the jury what was otherwise inadmissible.
It was earlier observed in this article that the first law in Wisconsin
was that it was within the discretion of the Court to permit medical
33 Note, 29 U. CiNc. L. REv. 255 (1960) ; Ruth v. Fenchel, 37 N.J. Super. 295,
117 A.2d 284, 292-3 (1955).
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books to be read to the jury be counsel.34 Subsequently in City of Ripon
v. Bittel,35 the Supreme Court of Wisconsin conceded that perhaps the
general rule was that treatises could not be admitted as evidence, but
could be read to the jury only for the force and authority which the
opinion of learned men may give. Actually this fuzzy distinction was of
no real importance in establishing a rule or in determining the case
because the Court added that the use of the books in the case was not
error for the reason that opposing counsel had objected only to the
materiality of the extracts rather than the competency. In addition the
Court construed the record to indicate that the witnesses stated they
founded their opinion upon treatises which in fact supported their
testimony, but in truth the witnesses were mistaken in this regard. Con-
sequently the admission was proper as impeaching evidence.
In any event, ten years later the Supreme Court reviewed the law
and adopted the majority view that statements contained in medical
treatises even though recognized as standard authorities were not ad-
missible to corroborate a witness's testimony because they constituted
hearsay.3 6 In the same year it was held that opinions contained in medi-
cal treatises could not be read to discredit a witness who did not rely
upon authorities to support his views, but relied solely upon his personal
knowledge and experience.3 7
Hence, it was also held in Boyle v. State,38 to be error to ask a wit-
ness what the written authorities stated upon a subject or to permit
counsel to read to a jury from a standard medical works in argument
to the jury. It was reasoned that if treatises could not be read in evidence
to the jury, witnesses could not be permitted to give extracts from
memory. An additional reason for support of the rule that medical
treatises could not be used was that "we should be inundated with books
of we should hold otherwise." Concern was also expressed about the
juror's ability to interpret such books, the fact that there are continual
changes of the scientific opinion because of new discoveries, and that
detached selected passages may be misleading.
In Kreuzinger v. Chicago & Northwestern Ry. Co.39 it was held that
an objection to such evidence could be waived by circumstances and by
the failure on the part of counsel to make a proper and timely objection.
Evidence as to the causes of a disease based upon a witness's reference
to medical treatises and his opinion concerning the consensus of recog-
nized authority was permitted because the objecting party waived the
objection by first introducing such so that he had the benefit of such
34 Note 2, supra.
3530 Wis. 614 (1872).36 Stelling v. Thorp, 54 Wis. 528, 11 N.W. 906 (1882).
3 Knoll v. State, 55 Wis. 249, 12 N.W. 369 (1882).
13857 Wis. 472, 15 N.W. 827 (1883).
39 73 Wis. 158, 40 N.W. 657 (1888).
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evidence and then did not raise the question of its competency or chal-
lenge it by an appropriate and timely objection later.
As a necessary corollary it was next held that medical witnesses
could not testify as to the cause of death by poisoning if all of their
knowledge upon the subject was derived from medical treatises or in-
struction.40 On rehearing the Court distinguished testimony based upon
knowledge gained from close attention and discriminating study and
practical experience from knowledge merely gained by reading a par-
ticular authority.
The ruling that medical experts who had no experience in the matter
could not testify from information solely derived from medical texts
was repeated in Zoldoske v. State.
41
In Waterman v. Chicago & A. Ry. Co.,42 it was held that medical
texts could be referred to on cross-examination where the witness testi-
fied that recognized standard authorities laid down certain propositions
when in fact other standard authorities did not do so. It was pointed out
however that cross-examination could not be conducted in such a way
as to get the contents of the books before the jury if they themselves
were inadmissible.
Cross-examination to determine whether a witness formerly ex-
pressed approval of conclusions expressed in a certain text with which
he now differs is permitted. 43 Where a witness testified that he knew of
no authority for a certain proposition and that he was familiar with a
certain text, such text may be offered to impeach his testimony if it is
contrary to the witness's statement.44
Effect of Lewandowski
The focusing upon some of the difficulties and problems encountered
in the use of learned treatises caused by the adoption of a rule permitting
their introduction as direct substantive evidence will serve to engraft
many of these rules and considerations upon their use in cross-
examination.
In most instances the treatises offered will be offered for the truth
of what they contain. Consequently the problems of technical terms,
unfair use, or undue consumption of time will be present in their use on
cross-examination as well as direct. Similarly the same foundation of re-
liability is necessary. A medical book or treatise must be shown to be
a recognized authority before it can be used in cross-examination.4 5
All of the case decisions do not make this clear. An exception, of course,
will be those instances when it is offered to impeach the witness's cred-
40 Soquet v. State, 72 Wis. 659, 40 N.W. 391 (1888).
4182 Wis. 580, 52 N.W. 778 (1892).
4282 Wis. 613, 52 N.W. 247 (1892).
43 Ruck v. Milwaukee Brewery Co., 114 Wis. 404, 129 N.W. 414 (1911).
4 Bruins v. Brandon Canning Co., 216 Wis. 387, 257 N.W. 35 (1934).
45 Note, 13 supra.
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ibility where the witness testifies that a written work states certain facts
or conclusions when in fact such treatise does not do so.
A new dimension added by Lewandowski in addition to the use of
learned treatises as direct substantive evidence is that such treatises can
be used to impeach the qualifications of a witness by showing that cur-
rently accepted authorities are contrary to the views he has expressed.
BEST EVIDENCE RULE
The best evidence rule requires that the contents of a writing must
be proved by the introduction of the writing itself. Its purpose, of
course, is to avoid either inadvertent or willful misstatement of a wit-
ness who testifies from his recollection. As applied to learned treatises
the witness might misquote the work to which he refers, but more fre-
quently the debate will be whether he has placed a proper construction
upon the passages upon which he relies. Consequently because of both
reasons it is necessary that the book itself be produced so the exact lan-
guage can be examined.
As a practical matter at some point the knowledge an expert has
gained from his personal experience and study will be undistinguishable
from that which he may have obtained from a particular book. It will be
recalled that the Supreme Court of Wisconsin in one of its earlier deci-
sions distinguished knowledge gained from discriminating study and
experience as against the reference to a specific authority.
Professor Wignore states the rule to be that where a witness relies
upon a specific book the book itself must be produced, but this does not
preclude a witness from being asked a general question as to the opinion
of the profession.46 He criticized an Iowa decision for improperly ap-
plying the best evidence rule by sustaining an objection to a question
which asked for the general consensus of medical authorities . 4 McKelvey
makes the distinction between proving a fact which has been put in
writing and proving the writing itself. He states that "because a fact
has been described in writing such does not exclude other proof of the
fact."4"
The problems involving the application of the best evidence rule may
arise in a number of ways during the course of the trial dependent upon
the posture of the expert's testimony. Reference to learned treatises by
a witness will almost inevitably call for the production of the books
themselves if they are relevant to any fact in issue.
TECHNIQUE IN USING LEARNED TREATISES
It already has been suggested that a rule requiring prior notice as a
condition to the use of learned treatises as direct evidence serves to per-
'6 1-1 \N'TG.1ORF. EVIDENCE, § 1694 at 9 (3rd ed. 1940).
47 Ibid.; Cf. Brodhead v. Wiltse, 35 Iowa 429 (1872), wherein the Iowa court
held that the knowledge gained from scientific works is admissible without
proving the works themselves.
-- ' NCi,-ELVEY, EVIDENCE, 609 (5th ed. 1944).
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mit the court to educate itself in reference to the subject which it will
litigate. This make for a more intelligently conducted trial. It also expe-
dites the use of the treatises during the course of the trial. Prior notice
might be excused when the treatise is offered on cross-examination or
rebuttal to challenge a witness's testimony concerning a particular au-
thority or the prevailing opinions of the authorities. This would be par-
ticularly justified when an expert witness has testified contrary to the
generally accepted opinion in a manner which could not be reasonably
anticipated and reference to learned treatises can resolve the issue simply
and the production of a live witness would be inconvenient or unduly
extend the trial.
It has been the suggested that it might be appropriate that the
various professional societies prepare and certify lists of accepted author-
ities for trial use. Such a certification is of course hearsay to which there
could be valid objection and the procedure might be more burdensome
and less efficient than having the written work qualified at the trial or
agreed to at the pretrial conference.
Objections to the introduction into evidence of extracts should point
out deficiency because they might be supplied when pointed out or sim-
ply go to weight rather than admissibility. Thus it has been held that the
admission of an extract over a general objection was not error even
though reliability had not be proved.4 9
Once the Court has determined that an extract is admissible, the
matter can be put directly to the jury by permitting counsel or the wit-
ness to read the passage. Usually the witness is asked if he has relied
upon any authority in reaching his opinion or if his opinion is corrobor-
ated by any authorities. Ordinarily a party will not limit himself to
treatise evidence alone, but will have an expert available to explain and
interpret its more technical aspects.
Frequently it is helpful if not absolutely necessary for counsel to
have the books before him to assist him in framing his questions. Many
courts have held that counsel may use the treatises to aid him in framing
questions to be asked.50
In regard to counsel's use of books to interrogate a witness it was
said in Tompkins v. West, as follows:
The motive was to, make the question more clearly intelligi-
ble ..... To require of counsel a learning in the technicalities of
all the sciences, ample enough, without special preparation, to
conduct intelligently a technical examination of an expert in such
science, would not only practically deny his right to conduct an
' Barfield v. So. Highland Infirmary, 191 Ala. 553, 68 So. 30 (1915); also see,
Kreuzinger v. Chicago and N.W. Ry. Co., supra, note 39.
50 Tompkins v. West, 56 Conn. 478, 16 A. 237 (1888) ; State v. Coleman, 20 S.C.
441 (1883) ; Moore v. State, 184 Ark. 682, 43 S.W.2d 228 (1931) ; Conn. Mutual
Life Ins. Co. v. Ellis, 89 Ill. 516 (1878).
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examination or cross-examination at all, but would virtually deny
to a party the assistance of counsel in many scientific matters. 1
Obvious reference to the book in the presence of the jury by counsel,
for the ostensible purpose of framing questions, effectively places the
contents of the book before the jury. Such questions as "Are you familiar
with the fact that Dr. Blackwell states ... ?" is a more obvious illustra-
tion of the point. If the effect of whatever technique is used is to convey
the impact of the treatise to the jury, the Court may have to make an
in camera determination as to the reliability of the treatise.
The display of books on counsel's table and the framing of questions
while holding such in his hand so as to impress the jury that such con-
tained views of eminent writers contrary to the opinion of the witness
has been held prejudicial error because the books were incimpetent. The
error might or might not be curable by an instruction to disregard the
inference created. 52 Professor Wigmore has referred to the exclusion
of learned treatises as evidence, but the approval of their use in framing
questions as a quibble.5 3
The courts have recognized other possibilities of abuse and "great
care should always be taken by the court . . . to see that the questions
read to the witness are so fairly selected as to present the author's views
on the subject of the examination." 54
While it may seem burdensome to require reproduction of the pas-
sages sought to be used, there are practical reasons for this suggestion
in addition to these already suggested. If the trial is lengthy, and those
in which such treatises are used usually are protracted, the Court can
better control the final argument as to fairness and keep it within the
record if it has the precise language conveniently before it. Wisconsin
follows the general rule that an assertion made in an opening statement
or in a closing argument need not be founded upon direct evidence p o-
vided that the fact so asserted may be inferred from the evidence.5
This poses the additional problem that certain inferences and theories
argues may be totally unwarranted medically although they may appear
to be plausible to the layman. Counsel might have to be warned p:-ior
to trial that the Court will severely restrict the arguments or inferences
and theories involving technical matters unless the inferences drawn
are substantiated or verified by the expert testimony of live witnesses.
Although the practice of sending such exhibits to the jury room
should be discouraged, reproduction might become essential in that caze.
The entire book is not in evidence and thtere is no assurance that a jury
5156 Conn. 478, 16 A. 237, 238-39 (1888).
.52Allen v. Boston Elevated Ry. Co., 212 Mass. 191, 98 N.E. 618 (1912); Briggs
v. Chicago and Great Western Ry. Co., 238 Minn. 472, 57 N.W.2d 572 (1953).
53 Note 4, supra.
5 Note 31, supra, at 519-20.
55 Kink v. Combs, 28 Wis. 2d 65, 135 N.W.2d 789 (1965).
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will confine itself to only those pages in evidence if the book is given
to the jury despite specific instruction. Finally copies of the extracts
may have to be substituted for the originals pending the period in which
either party has the right of appeal or in the case of appeal. Frequently
these documents or books come from medical libraries or the offices of
doctors who are most anxious to have them returned immediately after
trial.
Conclusion
The trial process is vulnerable to some of the risks anticipated in
the use of learned treatises as direct evidence. Actually the problems are
no different in most instances when books are used in cross-examination.
An experienced trial judge should have little difficulty in administering
the rule if he is forewarned of the problems discussed. Certainly his
problems concerning the proper use of treatises on cross-examination
are now simplified.
When Justice Stone of the Alabama Court wrote the opinion in
Stoudenmeier v. Williamson,56 in 1857 approving the use of learned
treatises as direct evidence he stated:
It is the boast of this age of advancing civilization, that, aided
and facilitated by the printer's art, the collected learning of past
ages has been transmitted to us. Shall we withhold the benefits of
this heritage from the contests of the courtroom? We think
not ....
Eighty-two years later another Alabama justice observed that Ala-
bama had not found the ends of justice defeated by the rule nor the
difficulties of its application very great.5 7
5G Note 6, supra, at 567.
5 Note 13, supra.
1967-68]
